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1. Introduction
This paper shows the high investment value of the
consensus wisdom displayed by active mutual funds.
Analyzing a comprehensive sample of active U.S.
equity funds from 1984 to 2008, we find that stocks
heavily overweighted by active funds, relative to their
benchmark indexes, perform substantially better than
their underweighted counterparts. The average return
spread is 7.56% per year on an equal-weighted basis,
after adjustments for loadings on market, size, value,
and momentum factors. The spread is 4.56% on a
value-weighted basis, and 7.20% when the weights
reflect the amount of fund investments. The superior
performance of stocks that are overweighted by the
active funds also is robust to a variety of measures of
portfolio tilts, adjustments for risk, and across differ-
ent subperiods.
These results demonstrate the superior ability of
active mutual funds to select stocks and stand in
stark contrast to the disheartening message from per-
formance literature that actively managed mutual
funds, on average, fail to outperform passive bench-
marks (e.g., Jensen 1968, Daniel et al. 1997, Fama
and French 2010). Rather than examine the total
returns to a fund’s portfolio, we aggregate decisions
by active mutual funds to deviate from benchmarks
into a stock-level measure and then assess its infor-
mation content. If active mutual funds deviate from
benchmarks to exploit their information advantages,
this measure can aggregate various pieces of infor-
mation scattered among managers and thus should
possess high statistical power to detect information
advantages.
Our findings suggest that actively managed mutual
funds are informed investors, whose costly acqui-
sition and implementation of information help im-
pound information into asset prices (Grossman and
Stiglitz 1980).1 Consistent with this view, the return
spread between stocks that the active funds over-
weight and underweight, relative to their benchmark
indexes, is higher for stocks with more firm-specific
information, as captured by high idiosyncratic volatil-
ities, but it is lower for stocks for which more
1 In 2010, active equity funds managed approximately 86% of total
U.S. equity mutual fund net assets, pushing the average expense
ratio for stock funds to be 0.95% (Investment Company Institute
2011, pp. 33, 64). French (2008) argues that the annual cost of active
investing is 0.67% of the aggregate market value.
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informed investors compete for private information,
as reflected by a higher breadth of active mutual
fund ownership. We also find that the deviation
from benchmarks positively predicts firms’ future
earnings surprises, which suggests the ability of
active fund managers to forecast firms’ fundamental
performance.
An alternative interpretation of the higher return
on the stocks that active funds overweight is that
it may reflect the effects of demand pressure on
prices (Gompers and Metrick 2001). In particular, if
active funds continue to buy stocks that they over-
weight, e.g., exhibiting herd behavior (Sias 2004), their
demand pressure could push stock prices above equi-
librium levels and lead to higher in-sample returns.
One implication of this view is that the higher returns
on stocks that active funds overweight should sub-
sequently reverse. However, we find no evidence of
return reversal in the subsequent three years, which
contradicts this prediction.2
The investment value of the consensus wisdom
of active mutual funds dissipates quickly when it
becomes publicly available. A self-financing strategy
that buys the stocks that active funds overweight
and shorts the stocks that they underweight, imple-
mented with a one-month lag, generates an equal-
weight four-factor alpha of 3.36% per year, with a
t-statistic of 2.42. The same strategy, implemented
with a lag of two months, generates a four-factor
alpha of 2.28%, with a t-statistic of 1.60. The U.S. Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires all
mutual funds to disclose their portfolio holdings with
a maximum delay of 45 days, so our results are con-
sistent with strong-form inefficiency but semistrong
efficiency.
We also split the sample into two subperiods, 1984–
1996 and 1997–2008, and find that the self-financing
strategy, implemented with a delay of two months,
generates a four-factor alpha of 4.32% per year, with
a t-statistic of 2.52, in the first subperiod, but only
1.56% per year, with a t-statistic of 0.73, in the second
subperiod. The same strategy, implemented without
delay, generates high abnormal returns of 5.88% and
10.08% per year in these two subperiods (both are
highly statistically significant). These results suggest
an intriguing time trend of enhanced stock market
efficiency in incorporating the information contained
in the consensus wisdom of active mutual funds.
How can we reconcile evidence that points to
strong informational advantages of active mutual
2 We also find a strong negative correlation between consecutive
changes in deviations from benchmarks. This position reversal sug-
gests that risk-averse informed active managers tend to unwind
their profitable positions to mitigate the long-run risk that arises
from future price movements due to unpredictable events.
funds with their overall lackluster performance
reported in the performance literature? We find that
in aggregate, active mutual funds invest less than 10%
of their assets in high alpha stocks, but approximately
one-third of their fund assets in low alpha stocks.
Therefore, a large four-factor stock alpha of 6.60% per
year on stocks that they overweight translates into a
small mutual fund alpha of less than 1% per year.
After accounting for trading costs, fees, and expenses,
little, if any, alpha remains for mutual fund investors
to capture.
The appearance of passiveness by mutual funds
in aggregate, such that little abnormal return can be
earned on the total fund portfolio, is consistent with
the equilibrium described by Berk and Green (2004),
but it naturally raises the question, Could individ-
ual fund managers have performed better by being
more active? This question is particularly important
in light of the declining degree of activeness in the
actively managed mutual fund industry (Cremers
and Petajisto 2009) and the diminishing mutual fund
alpha over time (Fama and French 2010). To explore
this question, for each individual fund we decom-
pose returns on fund holdings into two components:
a long–short active portfolio that consists of devia-
tions from benchmarks and a passive portfolio that
consists of investments in the benchmarks. The aver-
age Sharpe ratio for individual funds’ active portfo-
lios is significantly lower than that of their benchmark
portfolios. By combining active and passive port-
folios, actively managed mutual funds, on average,
achieve significantly higher Sharpe ratios for their
overall portfolios than those for their benchmarks or
active portfolios. We also create hypothetical fund
portfolios by forcing managers to be more active, scal-
ing up their active portfolios. However, we find little
improvement in Sharpe ratios when fund managers
are more aggressive in active investing. This evidence
suggests that, on average, active fund managers tend
to combine active and passive portfolios in such a
way that being more active leads to little marginal
improvement in performance.
A number of recent studies provide results that are
related to ours. Kacperczyk et al. (2005) and Cremers
and Petajiso (2009) provide evidence that more active
mutual funds tend to achieve better performance.
Our paper is particularly related to that of Cremers
and Petajisto (2009), who analyze the performance of
mutual funds with different levels of active share (i.e.,
deviations from index benchmarks). Our study, how-
ever, differs in several important aspects. First, we
focus on the performance of the stocks that are over-
and underweighted by mutual funds, rather than the
performance of mutual funds. Second, analyzing the
performance of stocks can provide more powerful
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and more reliable tests than analyzing the perfor-
mance of well-diversified funds that closely resemble
their benchmarks. For example, Cremers and Petajiso
(2009) show that the superior performance of active
funds relative to their benchmarks is driven primarily
by the underperformance of the benchmarks, but not
by the outperformance of the funds with high active
share (see, e.g., Cremers and Petajisto 2009, Table 8;
Cremers et al. 2013). Third, our stock-level analysis
also points to a specific element of skill exhibited
by active funds, namely, the ability to forecast future
earnings surprises. Finally, we are able to quantify
the potential gains for mutual funds to become more
active. Hence, focusing on the performance of stocks
over- or underweighted by active funds can help us
to better understand the investment ability of fund
managers.
Our paper is also related to those by Cohen et al.
(2010) and Pomorski (2009), who analyze the per-
formance of best ideas of mutual funds. Whereas
their analyses focus on the top holdings or trades
in each individual manager’s portfolio, we are inter-
ested in whether a measure that aggregates the active
weights across all relevant fund managers captures
their informational advantages as an investor group.
Moreover, our analysis of the entire portfolio compo-
sition of mutual funds enables us to detect the neg-
ative abnormal returns on stocks that active funds
choose to underweight. The analysis of the perfor-
mance of stocks that fund managers choose to under-
or overweight also sheds new light on aggregate
mutual fund performance. Last, we show that our
results are robust to controlling for fund managers’
best idea stocks.
Lewellen (2011) analyzes the holdings and returns
of institutional investors and finds that institutions as
a group show little tendency to deviate from the mar-
ket portfolio. Our analysis of the aggregate passive-
ness of active mutual funds provides complementary
evidence by examining the universe of active mutual
funds with cleanly defined performance benchmarks.
Importantly, however, we find that a measure that
aggregates individual funds’ deviations from bench-
marks has strong information content for firms’ future
stock returns and fundamental performance, which
suggests the existence of stock-picking skill. Our anal-
ysis therefore provides a case for active portfolio
management.
2. Consensus Wisdom of Active
Mutual Funds
This section introduces the construction of the con-
sensus wisdom of active mutual funds, namely, their
deviation from benchmarks, our data and sample con-
struction, and the summary statistics.
2.1. Deviation from Benchmarks
The building block for our measure of the con-
sensus view of active mutual funds is their devia-
tions from benchmarks. If active mutual funds aim
to outperform a passive benchmark index, they will
overweight a stock, relative to the benchmark when
they expect it to outperform, and underweight it
otherwise. In this scenario, each manager’s decision
of portfolio tilting reflects the expectation of future
returns to that stock conditional on the manager’s
information set (Roll 1992). Therefore, a stock level
measure that averages the decisions to deviate from
benchmarks across active funds whose investment
universe includes this stock can aggregate different
pieces of information about the future value of indi-
vidual stocks scattered among fund managers. If this
consensus view has information that is not fully
reflected in current market prices (i.e., mutual funds
as an investor group possess private information), it
should predict future stock returns.
Specifically, we measure a mutual fund j’s devi-
ation from its benchmark for stock i in quarter t
as the difference between this stock’s weight in the
fund portfolio, wji1 t , and its weight in the stock
index against which the fund’s performance is bench-
marked, wbi1 t . Then we create a stock-level measure
of mutual funds’ deviations from benchmarks, DFB, by
averaging the difference in portfolio weights across all
mutual funds whose investment universe comprises
this stock. A stock enters a mutual fund’s investment
universe if it (1) is held by the mutual fund or (2) is
a member of the fund’s benchmark index. We thus
define a measure of mutual funds’ deviations from
benchmarks for stock i as
DFBi1 t =
Ni∑
j=1
4w
j
i1 t −wbi1 t5
/
Ni1 (1)
where Ni is the number of funds whose investment
universe includes stock i.3 We argue, and provide evi-
dence, that this measure is more powerful to detect
active funds’ information advantages than previously
used proxies based on the level or breadth of active
fund ownership.
Naturally, active fund managers might deviate from
their benchmarks for other reasons, e.g., liquidity-
related motives or agency problems emphasized in
studies of incentives of fund managers.4 The port-
folio distortion effects arising from agency-related
3 We explore other ways to aggregate the active weights, e.g.,
weighting each fund’s active holdings based on net fund assets
or how active the fund is in deviating from the benchmark. Our
results remain robust when we use such weighting schemes, but
we present our main results using the simple intuitive scheme in
Equation (1).
4 See, e.g., Brown et al. (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and
Huang et al. (2011).
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problems could lead us to find evidence against the
information advantages of active mutual funds.
2.2. Data and Sample Selection
To construct our mutual fund database, we combine
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database with
the CDA/Spectrum Mutual Fund Holdings Database
from Thomson Financial via the MFLINKS. Follow-
ing Kacperczyk et al. (2008), we only include active
mutual funds that invest primarily in U.S. common
stocks; we eliminate balanced, bond, money mar-
ket, international, index, and sector funds, as well
as funds not invested primarily in equity securities.
Our sample includes 2,691 distinct active U.S. equity
funds, with the number increasing from 237 in 1984
to 1,510 in 2008.
Data on the monthly returns, prices, and market
values of equity for common stocks traded on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock
Exchange, and NASDAQ come from the CRSP. Con-
sistent with previous literature, we exclude closed-
end funds, real estate investment trusts, American
depository receipts, foreign companies, primes, and
scores (we keep only shares with codes of 10 or 11).
To mitigate the concern that our stock return tests
might be influenced by return outliers, we eliminate
stocks with prices below $5 as of the portfolio forma-
tion date (typically the end of the previous quarter).
2.3. Benchmark Index Holdings
We next compute the weights of each fund’s hold-
ings against its performance benchmark; the crucial
step is selecting the stock index that the fund seeks
to outperform. We use two methods to identify each
fund’s performance benchmark index. First, because
there might be a discrepancy between a mutual fund’s
self-declared performance benchmark and the actual
benchmark the fund follows (Sensoy 2009), we adopt
Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) method and select 19
benchmark indexes commonly used by practitioners:
the S&P 500, S&P 400, S&P 600, S&P 500/Barra Value,
S&P 500/Barra Growth, Russell 1000, Russell 2000,
Russell 3000, Russell Midcap, the value and growth
variants of the four Russell indexes, Wilshire 5000,
and Wilshire 4500. For each fund in each quarter, we
select from the 19 indexes the one that minimizes the
average distance between the fund portfolio weights
and the benchmark index weights.5 Data on the index
holdings of the 12 Russell indexes since their incep-
tion come from the Frank Russell Company, and data
5 We also experiment with selecting benchmarks on the basis of
moving averages of the distance between fund portfolio weights
and benchmark index weights in the past five years and obtain
qualitatively similar results.
on S&P 500, S&P 400, and S&P 600 index holdings
since December 1994 are from Compustat. For the
remaining indexes and time periods, we use the hold-
ings of index funds to approximate the index hold-
ings.6 Second, for each individual fund, we tailor
a performance benchmark by constructing a value-
weighted portfolio of all stocks the fund actually
holds. Since these two approaches generate quali-
tatively similar results, we report our main results
based on the first approach.
2.4. Characteristics of Stocks with Extreme DFB
In panel A of Table 1, we show the distribution of DFB
and its two components, fund portfolio weights and
benchmark index weights. The results indicate that
for a median stock in our sample, the DFB is close to
zero, 0.01%. The mean DFB is 0.09%, and the mean
fund weight is 0.17%. DFB has substantial dispersion,
with a standard deviation of 0.31%. As the distribu-
tion of DFB tends to be skewed to the right, we focus
on the decile ranks in our main analyses.
What are the characteristics of stocks with large
mutual fund over- and underweighting? Panel B of
Table 1 presents the results based on the decile port-
folios. At the end of each quarter, we sort stocks into
deciles according to their DFB, calculate the cross-
sectional averages of the characteristics, and report
their time-series averages. The results indicate that
stocks in decile 10 about which active funds display
the most conviction tend to be the least popular
among mutual funds; they reside in the investment
universe of only 38 funds. On the contrary, stocks
in decile 1 appear in the investment universe of
220 funds. On average, only 17 mutual funds hold
stocks in decile 10, compared with 40 funds holding
stocks in decile 1. These results indicate that stocks
with high active fund bets do not pertain just to a few
“hot” or popular names among money managers.
We find also that stocks heavily overweighted by
active funds tend to be relatively small, with an aver-
age decile rank value of 3.05, based on NYSE market-
cap decile breakpoints in ascending order. They have
a slight tendency to be winners in the previous year.7
There exists no apparent relation between DFB and
the book-to-market ratio. Interestingly, stocks over-
weighted by funds tend to have higher idiosyncratic
volatilities.
6 We obtain qualitatively similar results if we use index fund hold-
ings throughout our sample period.
7 We note that the high excess weights of decile 10 stocks in mutual
fund portfolios should not result mechanically from their high
past returns: Large increases in the relative prices of those stocks
increase their weights not only in the mutual fund portfolio, but
also in the benchmark index.
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Table 1 Summary of the Data: Decile Portfolios
Panel A: Distribution of DFB and the components
Mean SD 10th percentile 25th percentile Median 75th percentile 90th percentile
Fund weights (%) 0017 0031 0000 0003 0008 0019 0042
Benchmark weights (%) 0006 0016 0000 0000 0003 0007 0015
DFB (%) 0009 0031 −0005 −0001 0001 0008 0029
Panel B: Characteristics of decile portfolios sorted on the basis of DFB
Proportion of
Benchmark No. of funds in the No. of funds stocks outside of Market cap BM Pr1Yr Residual
Decile DFB (%) weights (%) stock-fund cohort holding the stock benchmarks (%) score (1–10) score (1–10) score (1–10) volatility (%)
1 −0014 0028 220 40 0000 6039 4053 6004 2000
2 −0004 0009 169 21 0000 4024 4070 5049 2046
3 −0002 0006 155 18 0001 3046 4095 5029 2068
4 0000 0004 112 13 0013 2081 5032 5024 2081
5 0001 0004 120 15 0022 3013 5038 5036 2076
6 0003 0005 138 20 0017 3061 5024 5054 2062
7 0006 0006 133 23 0017 3083 5022 5078 2057
8 0011 0006 113 24 0021 3089 5010 6008 2058
9 0023 0005 84 24 0033 3074 4096 6024 2067
10 0072 0003 38 17 0063 3005 4086 6069 2086
D10–D1 0086∗∗∗ −0025∗∗∗ −182∗∗∗ −23∗∗∗ 0063∗∗∗ −3034∗∗∗ 0033∗∗ 0065∗∗∗ 0086∗∗∗
Notes. At the end of each quarter, we compute for each stock a measure of mutual funds’ deviations from benchmarks, DFB, which is the simple average of
the stock’s weight in a mutual fund portfolio in excess of its weight in the fund’s benchmark index, across all mutual funds in the stock-fund cohort. We then
sort stocks into deciles in ascending order based on DFB and calculate the stock characteristics for each decile portfolio. A mutual fund belongs to a stock-fund
cohort if the stock appears in the mutual fund portfolio or is a member of the index against which the fund is benchmarked. For each mutual fund in each
quarter, we select from 19 stock indexes one benchmark index that minimizes the average distance between the fund portfolio weights and the benchmark
index weights. Panel A shows the distribution of DFB and the components. Panel B shows the characteristics of the decile portfolios. Our set of characteristic
variables includes the average deviations from benchmarks DFB, the average benchmark weight, the average number of funds in the stock-fund cohort, the
average number of funds that hold the stocks, the average proportion of stocks outside the benchmarks, the average proportion of funds in the stock-fund
cohort for which the stock is not held by funds but in their benchmarks, the market cap, the book-to-market (BM) ratio, past one-year return (Pr1Yr; skipping
the most recent month), and the residual return volatility in the past quarter. The market cap of a stock is computed by multiplying the stock price with the
number of outstanding shares at each quarter end (in millions). The book-to-market ratio is determined for each stock at the end of last calendar year using the
book value of the stock at the end of last fiscal year and the market value of the stock at the end of last calendar year. We regress the daily stock returns against
daily Fama and French (1993) factors in a given quarter and use the standard deviation of the residuals as the residual volatility of the stock for that quarter.
(At least 40 daily observations of stock returns must be available.) To facilitate comparison across deciles, we score for each quarter the size, book-to-market
ratio, and past returns from 1 to 10, with 10 representing the deciles with the largest market cap (based on NYSE breakpoints), highest book-to-market ratio,
and highest past one-year return. Stocks with prices lower than $5 at the previous quarter end are excluded.
∗∗Statistical significance at the 5% level; ∗∗∗statistical significance at the 1% level.
3. Information Content of the
Consensus Wisdom of Active
Mutual Funds
In this section, we evaluate the investment value
of the consensus view of active mutual funds, as
revealed through their deviations from benchmarks.
We start by looking at the relation between DFB
and future stock returns using both univariate port-
folio sorts and the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-
sectional regressions. Then we examine and find
evidence contradicting an alternative interpretation
of the return forecasting power of DFB, namely, the
demand pressure from mutual funds. We further eval-
uate the information content of DFB and examine its
implications for stock market efficiency and mutual
fund performance.
3.1. Return Forecasting Power of DFB
To evaluate the investment value of the consensus
view of active mutual funds, we first sort stocks
into deciles based on DFB and examine the subse-
quent performance of these decile portfolios. As we
update DFB each quarter, the portfolios accordingly
get rebalanced. Fama and French (2008) point out
that equal-weight portfolio returns may be driven by
tiny stocks that are numerous in number but small in
economic significance, whereas value-weighted port-
folio returns may be driven by a few very large
caps. Table 2 presents both equal-weighted and value-
weighted returns on the decile portfolios.
The first columns in panels A (equal-weighted re-
turns) and B (value-weighted returns) of Table 2 show
that DFB strongly predicts future returns. A port-
folio that buys stocks in decile 10 and sells stocks
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Table 2 Consensus Wisdom of Active Mutual Funds (DFB) and Future Stock Returns: Decile Portfolios
Panel A: Equal-weighted postranking portfolio return (%/month) Panel B: Value-weighted postranking portfolio return (%/month)
Average CAPM Carhart Five-factor DGTW-adj. Average CAPM Carhart Five-factor DGTW-adj.
Decile return alpha FF alpha alpha alpha return return alpha FF alpha alpha alpha return
1 0060 −0026 −0031 −0031 −0031 −0020 0074 −0008 −0003 −0004 −0004 −0011
420095 4−30295 4−50195 4−40765 4−40825 4−40025 420905 4−10135 4−00575 4−0095 4−00765 4−30125
2 0058 −0032 −0042 −0026 −0026 −0018 0087 0001 −0009 0000 0000 0002
410785 4−20535 4−60035 4−30775 4−30695 4−30665 430065 400175 4−10255 400075 400025 400365
3 0063 −0028 −0039 −0017 −0016 −0015 0087 −0002 −0012 0000 0000 0003
410865 4−10835 4−40795 4−20215 4−20115 4−20455 420955 4−00215 4−10445 4−00045 400035 400495
4 0074 −0012 −0022 −0006 −0005 −0011 0085 −0002 −0010 0001 0002 −0004
420295 4−00725 4−20085 4−00535 4−00485 4−10065 420855 4−00255 4−10285 400165 400225 4−00545
5 0083 −0005 −0017 −0002 −0002 −0007 0093 0001 −0008 0008 0007 0005
420515 4−00295 4−20125 4−00215 4−00225 4−00965 420995 400125 4−00775 400745 400615 400555
6 0093 0003 −0010 0004 0005 0008 0091 −0001 −0010 −0002 −0001 0005
420775 400165 4−1025 400475 400605 410295 420975 4−00095 4−10285 4−00275 4−00165 400695
7 1004 0013 0002 0013 0015 0012 1001 0011 0006 0012 0013 0011
430105 400835 400195 410605 410945 410905 430405 410505 400785 410635 410915 410865
8 1003 0011 0004 0003 0006 0008 0098 0005 0004 −0002 −0002 0005
430015 400665 400475 400395 400735 410195 430105 400565 400435 4−00255 4−00235 400625
9 1017 0024 0023 0015 0016 0018 1031 0036 0046 0024 0025 0032
430255 410325 420905 420005 420155 420425 430715 420235 430355 410905 410945 420885
10 1037 0044 0044 0032 0034 0041 1038 0043 0062 0033 0036 0035
430635 420155 440285 430355 430495 450365 430675 420275 430615 420405 420615 420225
D10–D1 0077∗∗∗ 0069∗∗∗ 0075∗∗∗ 0063∗∗∗ 0065∗∗∗ 0061∗∗∗ 0064∗∗∗ 0051∗∗ 0065∗∗∗ 0038∗∗ 0039∗∗ 0046∗∗∗
440305 430925 460075 450205 450355 460045 420625 420345 430475 420415 420595 420745
D9–D2 0059∗∗∗ 0056∗∗∗ 0065∗∗∗ 0041∗∗∗ 0042∗∗∗ 0036∗∗∗ 0044∗∗ 0034∗ 0055∗∗∗ 0024 0025 0030∗∗
440675 440445 460055 440015 430975 440065 420215 410825 430295 410595 410645 420125
Notes. This table presents the performance of decile portfolios formed on the basis of mutual funds’ deviations from benchmarks, DFB. At the end of each
quarter from 1984 Q1 to 2008 Q3, we sort stocks into deciles in ascending order based on DFB and compute the average monthly equal-weighted (panel A) and
value-weighted (panel B) portfolio returns in the subsequent quarter. We also present risk-adjusted performance of those portfolios, based on the CAPM, the
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (FF), the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, and a five-factor model that further includes the Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003) liquidity risk factor. Finally, we present the portfolio performance using the DGTW characteristic adjustment. Stocks with prices lower than $5 at the
previous quarter end are excluded.
∗Statistical significance at the 10% level; ∗∗statistical significance at the 5% level; ∗∗∗statistical significance at the 1% level.
in decile 1 generates average returns of 0.77% and
0.64% per month on equal- and value-weighted bases,
respectively. These returns are statistically signifi-
cant, with t-statistics of 4.30 and 2.62, respectively.
To examine whether the high returns on stocks heav-
ily overweighted by mutual funds simply reflect fund
managers’ propensity to take high risks, we employ
standard risk-adjustment models to examine the
abnormal returns. The specific risk-adjustment mod-
els include the capital asset pricing model (CAPM),
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, a four-
factor model including momentum, and a five-factor
model including the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liq-
uidity factor. In addition to linear factor models, we
employ a characteristic-adjustment procedure, as pro-
posed by Daniel et al. (1997; hereafter, DGTW).
The second through sixth columns in panels A
and B of Table 2 provide the results. The high
returns on stocks heavily overweighted by mutual
funds, in excess of the returns on their under-
weighted counterparts, remain large and statistically
significant after those adjustment procedures. For
example, the spread portfolio that buys stocks in
decile 10 and shorts stocks in decile 1 earns equal-
weighted abnormal returns of 0.69%, 0.75%, 0.63%,
0.65%, and 0.61% per month after the adjustments
according to the CAPM, three-factor model, four-
factor model, five-factor model, and DGTW adjust-
ment procedure, respectively. All five versions of
the alphas are highly statistically significant, with t-
statistics ranging between 3.92 and 6.07. A portfolio
characterized by long stocks in decile 9 and short
stocks in decile 2 also delivers superior performance
on an equal-weighted basis. Consistent with stocks
highly overweighted by mutual funds tending to be
relatively small, as we showed previously, the value-
weighted return on a long–short portfolio that buys
stocks in decile 10 and shorts stocks in decile 1 is
smaller but still economically meaningful and statis-
tically significant.
To examine the return predictive power of DFB in
the presence of other return predictors, we employ
Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions.
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In column (1) of Table 3 we show that DFB sig-
nificantly predicts future stock returns, whereas in
column (2) we show that this effect remains intact
after controlling for stock characteristics. To examine
large overweights and underweights separately, we
discretize DFB into two dummy variables: D1, which
represents the membership in the decile of stocks
with the lowest DFB, and D10, which represents
the membership in the decile with the highest DFB.
The slope coefficient for the dummy variables can
be interpreted as the difference in quarterly returns
between stocks in each respective decile and all stocks
in other deciles, while controlling for stock charac-
teristics. Specifically, at the end of each quarter from
Table 3 DFB and Future Stock Returns: Fama and MacBeth (1973) Cross-Sectional Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DFB t 305093∗∗∗ 305596∗∗∗
450795 480235
D1t −000135∗∗∗ −000108∗∗∗ −000134∗∗∗ −000105∗∗∗ −000086∗∗∗ −000112∗∗∗
4−30265 4−30715 4−30305 4−30695 4−30145 4−40025
D10t 000254∗∗∗ 000244∗∗∗ 000254∗∗∗ 000242∗∗∗ 000221∗∗∗ 000244∗∗∗
450305 460415 450365 460555 460205 470125
Benchmark Weightst 109064∗∗∗ 006756 006653 00697 008379∗
440225 410275 410315 410385 410725
Log(Market Capt ) −000029∗∗∗ −000023∗∗ −000024∗∗ −000034∗∗∗ −000023∗∗
4−20965 4−20135 4−20405 4−30415 4−20275
Log(BMt ) 000039 000039 000038 00004 000041
410455 410435 410435 410485 410545
Log(Pr1Yrt ) 000056∗∗∗ 000057∗∗∗ 000057∗∗∗ 000055∗∗∗ 000051∗∗∗
450815 450575 450895 450825 450715
Residual Volt −003389 −003487 −003461 −00346 −003536
4−10295 4−10345 4−10325 4−10315 4−10395
Turnovert −000089∗ −000088∗ −000087∗ −000092∗ −000095∗∗
4−10915 4−10875 4−10885 4−10985 4−20075
Pr1Mt −000054 −000019 −000029 −00006 −000142
4−00325 4−00115 4−00175 4−00355 4−00845
4MFO t −000442 −000096 −000426 −000436 000083
4−00785 4−00145 4−00765 4−00795 400135
4Breadth t 001306 001328 001304 000874 000843
410135 400835 410085 400715 400715
Best Ideast 000282∗∗∗
460345
4MFO t+1 009625∗∗∗
480465
Intercept 000052 000152 000073∗ 000142 000073 000151 000207 000141
410315 410085 410695 400985 410575 410095 410495 410035
R2 (%) 0044 6011 0069 6004 1001 6015 6026 7029
Notes. This table uses the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions to examine the relationship between mutual funds’ deviations from bench-
marks, DFB, at each quarter end and the market-adjusted returns in the subsequent quarters, Rt+1. To make the results comparable with the portfolio analysis,
we discretize DFB into two dummy variables, D10 (overweight), which equals 1 if the stock is in decile 10 with the highest DFB and 0 otherwise, and D1
(underweight), which equals 1 if the stock is in decile 1 with the lowest DFB and 0 otherwise. Market cap, book-to-market ratio, residual volatility, and turnover
ratio are defined as previously. The variable Benchmark Weights is the average weight of a stock in the benchmark indexes; Pr1Yr is the past one-year return
skipping the most recent month; Pr1Mt is the past one-month return; 4MFO is the change in the fraction of shares held by mutual funds (Chen et al. 2000);
and 4Breadth is the change in the number of mutual funds that hold the stock scaled by the total number of mutual funds that exist at the beginning of a
given quarter, as in Chen et al. (2002). Best Ideas is a dummy variable that represents the top holdings of individual fund managers as defined in Cohen et al.
(2010). Stocks with prices lower than $5 at the previous quarter end are excluded. We compute the t-statistics based on the Newey and West (1987) standard
errors.
∗Statistical significance at the 10% level; ∗∗statistical significance at the 5% level; ∗∗∗statistical significance at the 1% level.
Q1 of 1984 to Q3 of 2008, we perform cross-sectional
regressions specified as follows:
Ri1 t+1 = +D1i1 t + D10i1 t + Xi1 t + i1 t+11 (2)
where Ri1 t+1 is the return on stock i in quarter t+ 1
in excess of the market return in t + 1, and Xi1 t
includes stock characteristics such as the stock’s
average weight in the benchmark indexes, firm
size, the book-to-market ratio, past one-year (skip-
ping the most recent month) returns, idiosyncratic
volatilities, turnover, and past one-month return.
The results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 show
that stocks in decile 1 significantly underperform
other stocks, and stocks in decile 10 significantly
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outperform other stocks, even after we control for the
influence of those firm characteristics.8
Chen et al. (2000) argue that a trade-based mea-
sure of changes in the fraction of shares owned
by mutual funds (4MFO) is a significant predictor
of future stock returns. Chen et al. (2002) argue that
changes in the number of mutual funds that hold the
stock, 4Breadth, correlate with future stock returns.
When we include these variables in our cross-sectional
regressions to stress test the return forecasting power
of our measure of deviations from benchmarks in
columns (5) and (6), the results indicate that the return
forecasting power of DFB remains intact.9 Cohen et al.
(2010) argue that the top holdings of fund managers,
i.e., their best idea stocks, achieve superior perfor-
mance. In column (7), we include a dummy vari-
able that represents the best ideas of fund managers.10
The results indicate that controlling for the best ideas,
the return forecasting power of DFB is strong and sig-
nificant. Finally, to assess the influence of the contem-
poraneous demand shocks on stock prices, we include
the change in the fraction of shares owned by mutual
funds in quarter t+1 in the regression, and the results
in column (8) confirm that DFB is a reliable return pre-
dictor, even when we control for the influence of the
demand shocks in the next quarter.
In summary, we find evidence that a stock-level
measure that proxies for the consensus wisdom
of active fund managers, DFB, strongly and posi-
tively forecasts the cross-sectional variation in future
returns. The superior (inferior) performance of stocks
heavily overweighted (underweighted) by mutual
funds is consistent with the notion that actively man-
aged mutual funds behave as informed investors in
stock markets. In the next subsection, we investigate
an alternative interpretation of the return forecast-
ing power of DFB, that is, mutual funds’ demand
pressure.
3.2. Informed Investing or Price Pressure?
Although consistent with the notion that active funds
possess value-relevant information that is not fully
reflected in stock prices, the higher returns on stocks
8 Note that Table 3 uses quarterly stock returns as the dependent
variable, instead of monthly returns as in Table 2. Moreover, the
sample of stocks included in Table 3 is smaller than that in Table 2,
because the requirement of the availability of data on stock charac-
teristics such as the book-to-market ratio.
9 We verify that these two fund trade-based measures significantly
predict returns in the original sample periods of Chen et al. (2000,
2002), but exhibit insignificant return forecasting power in our
extended sample period. Nagel (2005) finds consistent evidence
that the change in mutual fund breadth has on average no rela-
tionship to future returns, when he expands the Chen et al. (2002)
sample by five years.
10 We use the top holding of each fund manager. The results are
very similar if we use top five holdings of fund managers.
with higher DFB may have alternative interpretations
as well. For example, Gompers and Metrick (2001)
argue that the expansion of institutional investors in
U.S. stock markets impacted stock prices, driving up
the prices of the stocks they preferred to hold beyond
equilibrium levels and thus increasing the in-sample
returns on those stocks. Does a demand pressure
story explain the higher future returns on stocks with
large active mutual fund bets?
In this subsection, we examine the implication
of the price pressure story for long-horizon stock
returns: If the high returns on stocks with high DFB
arise mainly from demand pressure, these returns
subsequently should reverse. If, however, the high
returns come mostly from value-relevant information
possessed by fund managers, and the market reacts
properly to that information, we expect to observe no
subsequent return reversal.
To test for these hypotheses, we perform regres-
sions similar to Equation (2) with the market-adjusted
returns in quarters t + k (k ranging from 1 to 12) as
dependent variables. Figure 1 presents the average
slope coefficients for D1 and D10 and their 95th per-
cent confidence intervals. The results indicate that the
coefficients for D1 and D10 revert quickly to zero after
one quarter and then fluctuate around zero. Impor-
tantly, we find no evidence of return reversal, which
contradicts the price pressure story.
3.3. Stock Characteristics
To increase our confidence in this information-based
story, we conduct a series of tests based on stock
attributes. First, we examine the return forecasting
power of DFB across size groups. The idea is that
very large firms tend to be more transparent, with
better disclosure policies. They also tend to be more
closely followed and researched by market partic-
ipants. It is therefore more difficult for individual
funds to gain information advantages on those firms.
Second, along a similar vein of thinking, if mutual
funds have informational advantages about individ-
ual stocks, we expect their advantages to be greater
among stocks with more firm-specific information.
Third, we expect active funds’ informational advan-
tages to be more valuable when the funds have fewer
competitors. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980, p. 394) con-
jecture that “the more individuals who are informed,
the more informative is the price system.” A corol-
lary of that conjecture is that the consensus view of
active funds would have a lower investment value
for stocks with a large number of informed mutual
fund holders.11
11 A caveat is that the precision of aggregated signals increases with
the number of funds included in the computation, which could
countervail the effects of competition among informed investors.
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Figure 1 Persistence of the Return Forecasting Power of DFB: Quarterly Fama–MacBeth Regression Coefficients
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Notes. This figure plots the average Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression coefficients for two dummy variables D1 and D10 (stocks heavily
underweighted and overweighted by active mutual funds respectively) and their 95% confidence intervals. D1 (D10) equals 1 if a stock belongs to the bottom
(top) decile of DFB heavily underweighted (overweighted) by active mutual funds. The dependent variables in the regressions are market-adjusted returns in
quarter t + k, with k ranging from 1 to 12, and k corresponds to the ticks in the horizontal axis. Other independent variables include the natural logarithm of
market cap in millions of dollars; book-to-market ratio; return in the past year, Pr1Yr; idiosyncratic volatility; turnover ratio; return in the past month, Pr1Mt;
4MFO ; and 4Breadth. The variable 4MFO is the change in the fraction of shares held by mutual funds, as in Chen et al. (2000), and 4Breadth is the change
in the number of mutual funds that hold the stock scaled by the total number of mutual funds that exist at the beginning of a given quarter, as in Chen et al.
(2002). Stocks with prices lower than $5 at the end of quarter t are excluded.
To examine these hypotheses, we perform two-way
sorts of stocks independently on DFB and firm size
as well as proxies for the amount of firm-specific
information and the number of mutual funds com-
peting for private information. We use the idiosyn-
cratic volatility, computed as the standard deviation
of residuals from regressions of daily excess stock
returns on the Fama and French (1993) factors in
the past quarter, to proxy for the amount of firm-
specific information, and the number of active funds
that hold the stock at each quarter end to proxy
for the number of investors competing for private
information. Specifically, we sort stocks into quar-
tiles based independently on DFB and stock char-
acteristics such as size, idiosyncratic volatilities, or
the number of mutual fund holders. Sixteen portfo-
lios thus emerge from the intersection of the double
sorts. We hypothesize that a strategy that buys high
DFB stocks and sells low DFB stocks generates higher
abnormal returns among mid-caps and stocks with
higher idiosyncratic volatilities and a lower number
of mutual fund investors.
Table 4 presents the results. To conserve space, we
only present equal- and value-weighted four-factor
alphas, but the results are qualitatively similar if
we use other specifications of asset pricing models.
Panel A of Table 4 shows that a strategy that buys
high DFB and shorts low DFB stocks generates the
lowest four-factor alpha among very large firms in
quartile 4, but produces large and significant four-
factor alphas for mid-cap stocks in quartiles 2 and 3,
ranging between 0.54 and 0.64% per month on both
equal- and value-weighted bases. Possibly because of
the noise of small stock returns, we do not find signif-
icant return spread associated with DFB for tiny firms
in quartile 1. Panel B of Table 4 shows that a strat-
egy that is long high DFB and short low DFB stocks
for stocks with high idiosyncratic volatilities yields
average monthly four-factor alphas of 0.95% (t = 5043)
on the equal-weighted basis and 0.91% (t = 3046) on
the value-weighted basis. A similar strategy using
stocks with low idiosyncratic volatilities generates
average monthly four-factor alphas of only 0.21% (t =
3006) on the equal-weighted basis and only 0.17%
(t = 1043) on the value-weighted basis. The difference
in abnormal returns between these two strategies is
large and statistically significant for both equal and
value weighting. These results support our conjecture
that informed mutual funds could have better infor-
mation advantages in stocks with more firm-specific
information.
The results in panel C of Table 4 also support the
information-based story. A strategy that buys high
DFB stocks and sells low DFB stocks generates a
value-weighted monthly four-factor alpha of 0.84%
(t = 4029) when implemented among stocks with a
low number of mutual fund investors; the same strat-
egy when implemented among stocks with a high
number of mutual fund investors produces a value-
weighted monthly four-factor alpha of only 0.18%
(t = 1043). This difference in abnormal returns also is
large and statistically significant.
3.4. DFB and Earnings News
If mutual funds have informational advantages about
the stocks they overweight relative to their bench-
marks, we expect those stocks to perform particularly
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Table 4 Return-Predictive Power of DFB and Stock Characteristics
Equal-weighted portfolio return Value-weighted portfolio return
(Carhart alpha percent/month) (Carhart alpha percent/month)
DFB DFB
Rank
variables 1 4 Q4–Q1 1 4 Q4–Q1
Panel A: Stock size
1 −0018 0017 0035 −0025 0023 0049∗
4−0085 410255 410285 4−10125 410735 410805
2 −0027 0027 0054∗∗∗ −0023 0032 0055∗∗∗
4−20635 420525 430945 4−20335 430145 440185
3 −0036 0027 0063∗∗∗ −0035 0029 0064∗∗∗
4−40245 420015 430515 4−40415 420125 430515
4 −0017 0013 0030∗ −0003 0023 0025∗
4−30415 400825 410875 4−00665 410985 410925
Q4–Q1 0000 −0004 −0004 0023 −0001 −0023
400025 4−00175 4−00135 410055 4−00035 4−00775
Panel B: Residual volatilities
1 0005 0026 0021∗∗∗ −0004 0014 0017
400505 420385 430065 4−00495 410285 410435
2 −0013 0026 0039∗∗∗ −0025 0041 0067∗∗∗
4−1045 420345 440055 4−20295 420615 430405
3 −0024 0032 0056∗∗∗ −002 0039 0059∗∗
4−20955 420805 440035 4−1015 410965 420285
4 −101 −0015 0095∗∗∗ −1008 −0017 0091∗∗∗
4−70355 4−10095 450435 4−5075 4−00535 430465
Q4–Q1 −1015∗∗∗ −0041∗∗ 0074∗∗∗ −1004∗∗∗ −003 0074∗∗∗
4−50335 4−20025 440115 4−40595 4−00915 420685
Panel C: Number of funds
1 −0049 0013 0063∗∗∗ −007 0013 0084∗∗∗
4−30815 410005 430965 4−50085 400875 440295
2 −003 0015 0045∗∗∗ −0034 0013 0047∗∗∗
4−30255 410435 430015 4−30125 410015 420995
3 −0023 0031 0054∗∗∗ −0022 0053 0075∗∗∗
4−20255 420605 430285 4−20315 420835 430545
4 −0012 0015 0027∗∗ −0001 0017 0018
4−10815 410215 420095 4−00225 410655 410435
Q4–Q1 0037∗∗ 0003 −0033∗ 0069∗∗∗ 0006 −0064∗∗∗
420285 400145 4−10725 450085 400325 4−30185
Notes. This table presents the relationship between the return-predictive
power of DFB and stock characteristics. Specifically, at the end of each quar-
ter from 1984 Q1 to 2008 Q3, we sort stocks independently based on their
characteristics and DFB into quartiles. Sixteen portfolios thus form from
these double sorts, with portfolio (111) containing stocks with the lowest
value of the sorting variables and vice versa. The characteristics include mar-
ket cap (panel A), residual volatilities (panel B), and the number of funds
that hold the stock (panel C). Then we calculate the average monthly equal-
weighted and value-weighted returns for each of 16 portfolios for the subse-
quent quarter. We also report the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha differences
between the extreme portfolios. Stocks with prices lower than $5 at the quar-
ter end are excluded.
∗Statistical significance at the 10% level; ∗∗statistical significance at the
5% level; ∗∗∗statistical significance at the 1% level.
well around the days their positive information gets
released to the market. In stock markets, one of the
most important corporate news events is the release
of corporate earnings.
To explore the nature of the information con-
tent captured by DFB, we start by examining the
relationship between DFB and firms’ future earnings
surprises. We use two proxies for earnings sur-
prises. The first proxy is the difference between actual
earnings and the consensus analyst earnings fore-
casts from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate Sys-
tem (I/B/E/S) divided by the absolute value of
actual earnings, and the second is the same difference
deflated by the stock price at the end of the previ-
ous quarter. For each quintile portfolio based on DFB,
we calculate the earnings surprises for the median
firm in the following four quarters and report their
time-series averages. Panels A and B of Table 5 show
that stocks with high DFB tend to experience large
and positive earnings surprises for up to the next
four quarters, and the effect, strongest for the most
proximate quarter, decays substantially through time.
There is evidence of earnings momentum (e.g., Chan
et al. 1996). If active mutual funds trade on earn-
ings momentum, we could observe a positive associa-
tion between DFB and subsequent earnings surprises.
To examine this conjecture, we first group stocks into
terciles based on the current quarter’s earnings sur-
prises and then divide the stocks within each ter-
cile into five quintiles based on DFB. We average
the difference in earnings surprises between high and
low DFB stocks across the three terciles and report
this averaged difference as momentum-adjusted earn-
ings surprises. This adjustment eliminates the higher
earnings surprises in the next two to four quar-
ters for stocks that active funds overweight, but for
the most proximate quarter, stocks with higher DFB
continue to experience significantly higher earnings
surprises.
We also examine the three-day abnormal returns
surrounding earnings announcements for each port-
folio of stocks sorted on the basis of DFB. Panel C of
Table 5 shows that an average stock in the top quin-
tile of stocks heavily overweighted by mutual funds
earns, in the time around earnings announcements in
the following quarter, a three-day cumulative abnor-
mal return of 29.8 basis points, which is statistically
significant. In contrast, an average stock in the bot-
tom quintile heavily underweighted by mutual funds
generates a three-day cumulative abnormal return of
only 3.4 basis points. Even after adjustments for earn-
ings momentum, the difference in three-day abnormal
returns around earnings announcements is 24 basis
points and statistically significant. These results sug-
gest that a significant portion of the return premi-
ums on the stocks mutual funds heavily overweight
occurs around corporate earnings releases, which
in turn implies that part of active funds’ superior
information relates to firms’ fundamental prospects.
Baker et al. (2010) provide important evidence that
aggregate trades of mutual fund managers associate
with future earnings surprises, which suggests that
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Table 5 DFB and Future Earnings News
Quarters
t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4
Panel A: Earnings surprise scaled by actual earnings (%)
Q1 00159 00393 00462 00453
400325 410055 410265 410195
Q5 20470 10840 10262 00858
450625 440355 420815 410855
Q5–Q1 20353∗∗∗ 10447∗∗∗ 00800∗∗∗ 00405∗∗
460035 490055 450695 420225
Q5–Q1 (momentum-adj.) 10384∗∗∗ 00474 00468 00467
450315 400935 410385 410125
Panel B: Earnings surprise scaled by price (%)
Q1 −00004 00002 00003 00003
4−00395 400305 400445 400425
Q5 00033 00025 00015 00010
450605 440275 420445 410465
Q5–Q1 00038∗∗∗ 00023∗∗∗ 00012∗∗∗ 00007∗∗
440065 460935 460365 420105
Q5–Q1 (momentum-adj.) 00024∗∗∗ −00010 00004∗ 00002
440235 4−00745 410705 400655
Panel C: CARs around earnings announcement (%)
Q1 00034 00086 00075 00063
410205 430135 430015 420475
Q5 00298 00163 00157 00140
450065 430255 430185 420885
Q5–Q1 00260∗∗∗ 00077 00082∗ 00076∗
440325 410465 410975 410935
Q5–Q1 (momentum-adj.) 00243∗∗∗ −00005 00017 00053
430135 4−00155 400355 410185
Notes. This table presents the forecasting power of DFB for subsequent
earnings surprises. At the end of each quarter from 1984 Q1 to 2008 Q3,
we sort stocks into quintiles, based on DFB, in ascending order and com-
pute the average quarterly earnings surprise and the cumulative abnormal
returns around the earnings announcement in the four quarters following
the portfolio formation date. The earnings surprise is the difference between
actual earnings and consensus analyst forecast, divided by the absolute value
of actual earnings or stock price. The earnings announcement cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) is calculated for the three days around the earnings
announcement date. Earnings data and earnings announcement dates come
from I/B/E/S. To adjust for earnings momentum, we first group stocks into
terciles based on the current quarter’s earnings surprises and then divide the
stocks within each tercile into five quintiles based on DFB. We average the
difference in earnings surprises for subsequent quarters between high and
low DFB stocks across the three terciles and report the averaged difference
as momentum-adjusted earnings surprises. Stocks with prices lower than $5
at the previous quarter end are excluded. The t-statistics are computed using
the Newey and West (1987) standard errors.
∗Statistical significance at the 10% level; ∗∗statistical significance at the
5% level; ∗∗∗statistical significance at the 1% level.
fund managers actively trade stocks prior to earnings
announcements to exploit their informational advan-
tages. Jiang and Zheng (2012) propose a measure to
rank mutual fund managers based on their ability to
forecast earnings. They find strong persistence and
performance predictive power of active funds’ ability
to forecast earnings.
3.5. DFB and Stock Market Efficiency
The results so far establish that active mutual funds
as a group possess significant value-relevant informa-
tion that is not fully incorporated into stock prices,
which is inconsistent with strong-form market effi-
ciency (Fama 1970). In this subsection, we exploit
the consensus view of active mutual funds to further
study the implications for market efficiency. We are
interested in how fast the stock market incorporates
the information contained by the consensus wisdom
of active mutual funds, so that no abnormal returns
can be earned. In particular, we form self-financing
strategies that buy stocks that active funds over-
weight in decile 10 and short stocks that they under-
weight in decile 1, implemented with lags from zero
to three months. We compute the equal-weighted
four-factor alpha on these strategies.12 We use the
four-factor alpha on the strategy executed without
lag, as a benchmark alpha, to measure the invest-
ment value of the information contained by the con-
sensus view of active mutual funds. Then we deflate
the alpha on the strategies implemented with various
lags by that benchmark alpha to evaluate how fast
the information contained by the consensus wisdom
of active funds flows into stock prices.
Figure 2 presents the results. We perform the anal-
ysis for the full sample and two subsamples 1984–
1996 and 1997–2008. Panel A shows the relative alpha
for the strategies implemented with lags from one to
three months. Panel B shows the t-statistics for the
alpha. The average four-factor alphas for the strat-
egy implemented without lag are 7.56%, 5.88%, and
10.08% per year (with t-statistics of 5.21, 3.38, and
4.32) for the full sample and two subsample periods.
For our full sample period, the self-financing strat-
egy implemented with a lag of one month achieves
44% of the abnormal return generated by the same
strategy implemented without lag, or 3.36% per year
with a t-statistic of 2.42. Executed with a delay of
two months, this self-financing strategy earns 30% of
the abnormal return generated by the same strategy
implemented without lag, or 2.28% per year with a
t-statistic of 1.60. Considering the fact that the SEC
requires all mutual funds to disclose their portfo-
lio holdings with a maximum delay of 45 days, the
decline of abnormal returns to zero with a delay of
two months is consistent with semistrong efficiency.
When we look at the time-series evidence, we find
that in the period 1984–1996 the self-financing strat-
egy executed with a delay of two months generates
73% of the abnormal return yielded by the same strat-
egy implemented without lag, or an abnormal return
12 The value-weighted four-factor alpha is statistically insignificant
when the strategy is implemented with a lag of more than one
month.
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Figure 2 Value of the Consensus Wisdom of Active Mutual Funds and
Stock Market Efficiency
Panel A: Profitability of trading on the consensus view with lags
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Notes. This figure shows how fast the stock market incorporates the infor-
mation contained by the consensus wisdom of active mutual funds so that
no abnormal returns can be earned. In particular, we form self-financing
strategies that buy stocks active funds overweight in decile 10 and short
stocks they underweight in decile 1, implemented with lags from zero to three
months. We compute the four-factor equal-weighted alpha on these strate-
gies. In panel A, we use the alpha for the strategy executed without lag as the
benchmark to deflate the alpha for the strategies implemented with various
lags. In panel B, we show the t-statistics for the alpha. We perform this anal-
ysis for the whole sample (left columns) and two subsamples, 1984–1996
(center columns) and 1997–2008 (right columns). The average four-factor
alphas for the strategy implemented without lag are 7.56%, 5.88%, and
10.08% (with t-statistics of 5.21, 3.38, and 4.32), respectively, per year for
the full sample and two subsample periods.
of 4.32% per year with a t-statistic of 2.52. In the
period 1997–2008, the self-financing strategy executed
with a delay of two months generates only 15% of the
abnormal return yielded by the same strategy imple-
mented without lag, or an abnormal return of only
1.56% per year with a t-statistic of 0.73.13
3.6. DFB and Mutual Fund Performance
How can we reconcile our evidence that points to
strong informational advantages of mutual funds
13 The sharp increase in the speed for the stock market to incor-
porate the information contained by the consensus wisdom of
active mutual funds is impressive, particularly in light of the
higher investment value of the consensus wisdom that we observe
in the second subperiod. We conjecture that this increase in the
investment value could be due to the growing number of active
mutual funds, which allows us to obtain a more precisely mea-
sured consensus view and thus a more powerful test of their invest-
ment value.
in stock markets with the overall lackluster perfor-
mance of mutual funds identified by prior litera-
ture? To understand the contribution of stocks with
large active fund bets to the overall performance
of active funds, for each decile of stocks sorted on
the basis of DFB we calculate the fund investment-
weighted portfolio returns and report the fraction of
total mutual fund assets invested in each decile port-
folio. The results in Table 6 indicate that stocks in
decile 10 heavily overweighted by active funds gener-
ate high abnormal returns with a four-factor alpha of
6.60% per year. But active funds in aggregate invest
less than 10% of their assets in those stocks. On the
other hand, although stocks in decile 1 heavily under-
weighted by active funds generate a four-factor alpha
close to zero, they receive approximately 34% of total
Table 6 DFB and Mutual Fund Performance
Holdings-weighted postranking portfolio
return (percentage/month)
Percentage of
aggregate fund Average CAPM FF Carhart
Decile investments return alpha alpha alpha
1 33076 0077 −0008 −0002 −0005
420865 4−10185 4−00415 4−10035
2 7033 1004 0015 0006 0015
430445 410495 400615 410535
3 5039 0095 0004 −0007 0004
430115 400295 4−00655 400395
4 3046 0091 0001 −0008 0004
420765 400105 4−00775 400285
5 4059 1001 0007 −0003 0015
430145 400545 4−00225 410225
6 6063 1001 0007 −0005 0007
430155 400525 4−00465 400625
7 8070 1013 0021 0016 0022
430615 420215 410735 420425
8 9077 1007 0013 0011 0007
430295 410135 410035 400595
9 11006 1040 0044 0051 0034
440115 430015 440095 420975
10 9030 1062 0063 0084 0055
430895 420675 430655 430045
D10–D1 0085∗∗∗ 0071∗∗∗ 0087∗∗∗ 0060∗∗∗
420965 420725 430605 430045
D9–D2 0037∗∗ 0029∗ 0046∗∗∗ 0019
420075 410685 430045 410355
Notes. This table presents the contribution of portfolios sorted on the basis
of DFB to the aggregate mutual fund performance. At the end of each quarter
from 1984 Q1 to 2008 Q3, we sort stocks into deciles, based on DFB, in
ascending order and compute the aggregate fund dollar holdings for each
decile. We calculate the average monthly holdings-weighted portfolio returns
in the subsequent quarter, and also present the risk-adjusted performance
of those portfolios, based on the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model (FF), and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Stocks with
prices lower than $5 at the previous quarter end are excluded.
∗Statistical significance at the 10% level; ∗∗statistical significance at the
5% level; ∗∗∗statistical significance at the 1% level.
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active fund assets. Therefore, despite the large four-
factor alpha of 6.60% per year on high DFB stocks
in decile 10, the value-weighted average four-factor
alpha for active mutual funds as a group is only 1.49%
per year before fees and expenses.
Lewellen (2011) documents the declining perfor-
mance of institutional investors. Barras et al. (2010)
make a similar observation for mutual funds. What
leads to the declining alpha for mutual funds? One
possibility is that mutual funds as a group are losing
their information advantage relative to other mar-
ket participants (e.g., the growing hedge fund indus-
try), which leads to their deteriorating performance.
Our evidence in the previous subsection contradicts
this view by showing that the consensus wisdom
of active mutual funds has higher investment val-
ues in the more recent decade. Therefore, it is likely
that the active mutual fund industry has been trend-
ing toward being less active. In untabulated results,
we follow the technique of grouping mutual funds
on the basis of their active share, as proposed by
Cremers and Petajisto (2009), and compute the frac-
tion of mutual fund assets invested in each category
of active share. This evidence confirms and extends
the analysis of Cremers and Petajisto (2009) by show-
ing the shrinking fraction of assets managed by active
fund managers.
Our results support the notion that an average
active mutual fund can generate significant alpha,
a crucial assumption maintained by Berk and Green
(2004). The appearance of passiveness by mutual
funds in aggregate, such that little abnormal return
can be earned on the total fund portfolio, is also con-
sistent with the equilibrium described by Berk and
Green (2004). But they naturally raise the question,
Could individual fund managers have performed bet-
ter by being more active? To explore this question, for
each individual fund we decompose returns on fund
holdings into two components: a long–short active
portfolio that consists of deviations from benchmarks
and a long-only passive portfolio that consists of their
investments in the benchmarks.14 Our first test is a
comparison of the distribution of Sharpe ratios of
active, passive, and overall fund portfolios for the
cross-section of mutual funds. Because our sample
period from 1984 to 2008 covers the recent financial
crisis, we gauge the influence of the financial crisis
on the results by using different schemes to remove
14 The active portfolio return is computed as Ractivej1 t+1=
∑Nj
i=14w
j
i1 t−w
bj
i1 t5 ·
Ri1 t+11 where Ractivej1 t+1 is the return to fund j’s active portfolio in
month t+1, wji1 t is the weight of stock i in fund j’s portfolio in quar-
ter t, w
bj
i1 t is the weight of stock i in fund j’s benchmark index in
quarter t, and Ri1 t+1 is the return on stock i in month t+1. According
to this equation, overweighted stocks enter the long position of the
active portfolio, and underweighted stocks enter the short position.
Table 7 Could Individual Fund Managers Have Performed Better by
Being More Active?—Average Sharpe Ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Active portfolio 0030 0031 0030 0028 0024
Benchmark 0049 0051 0045 0035 0018
Fund portfolio 0056 0059 0053 0042 0025
Hypothetical fund portfolio 0056 0059 0053 0043 0026
Benchmark–active portfolio 0019 002 0015 0007 −0006
Fund portfolio–active portfolio 0025 0027 0022 0014 0001
Fund portfolio–benchmark 0006 0007 0007 0007 0006
Hypothetical–actual fund 0021 0021 0026 0033 0042
(×100) 4001255 4001315 4001315 4001415 4001545
Notes. This table shows average Sharpe ratios for the active portfolio,
benchmark index, and total fund portfolio of individual mutual funds. It also
shows the average Sharpe ratio of a hypothetical fund that combines the
benchmark index and 1.10 times the active portfolio. The analyses involve
2,273 distinct funds with at least two years of return history. We test the
difference in the Sharpe ratios of the hypothetical and actual fund portfolios
for each individual fund, following the robust inference method proposed
by Ledoit and Wolf (2008), and report in parentheses the fraction of funds
with significant improvements in Sharpe ratios at the 5% level. We use
five sample periods: period (1), April 1984–December 2006; period (2),
April 1984–June 2007; period (3), April 1984–December 2007; period (4),
April 1984–June 2008; period (5), April 1984–December 2008.
the crisis period from our sample. The tests involve
2,273 distinct funds with at least two years of return
history.
As shown in Table 7, the average Sharpe ratio for
each individual fund’s active portfolio is lower than
that of the fund’s benchmark portfolio. By combining
the active and passive portfolios, actively managed
mutual funds on average achieve higher Sharpe ratios
for their overall portfolios than those on their bench-
marks or active portfolios. These results hold for the
sample periods excluding the recent financial crisis
in different ways (columns (1)–(4)). Even when we
include the last six months in 2008 when the bench-
mark indexes plummeted (column (5)), on average,
overall fund portfolios have Sharpe ratios that are 1%
higher than those of the active portfolios.
To illustrate whether individual fund managers
could achieve better performance by being more
active, we construct hypothetical fund portfolios con-
sisting of the benchmark portfolio and 1010× the
active portfolio. In other words, the managers of
those hypothetical funds are forced to be more active
with an extra 10% invested in each side of the
(long–short) active portfolio. We compute the aver-
age Sharpe ratios for these hypothetical funds and
examine the marginal gains from being more active.
The results indicate that for an average fund in our
sample, the increase in Sharpe ratio is less than 1% by
being 10% more active. To assess the statistical signif-
icance of the difference in Sharpe ratios between the
hypothetical and actual fund portfolios, we use the
bootstrap-based technique proposed by Ledoit and
Wolf (2008), which is robust to nonnormality of return
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Figure 3 Improvements in Sharpe Ratios by Being More Active
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Notes. This figure shows the average increase in Sharpe ratios for mutual funds with increasing proportional investments (from 10% to 100%) in the active
portfolios. We use monthly excess fund returns to compute the Sharpe ratios, which are annualized by multiplying the ratio by the square root of 12. Panels A–D
correspond the following four sample periods: April 1984–December 2006, April 1984–June 2007, April 1984–December 2007, and April 1984–June 2008.
distributions and has superior small-sample perfor-
mance. Then we present the fraction of funds that
could significantly improve the Sharpe ratio at the
5% level. The results indicate that for the majority of
active funds, the improvement in Sharpe ratios is sta-
tistically insignificant.15 Although less than 15% funds
could achieve statistically significant enhancements
in Sharpe ratios by becoming more active, the mag-
nitude of the improvements is small. The intuition
for the difference between fund-level and stock-level
analyses lies in the fact that individual fund managers
cannot form well-diversified portfolios that aggregate
the overweighting and underweighting decisions of
15 Following the insight of Gibbons et al. (1989), we also conduct a
formal test for whether individual funds can achieve better perfor-
mance by tilting their portfolios more toward the active portfolios.
The idea is that if active fund managers combine active and pas-
sive portfolios to maximize the funds’ Sharpe ratios, then in time-
series regressions of monthly returns to the fund’s active portfolio
on the fund’s total excess return, the intercepts should be statisti-
cally indistinguishable from zero. A significantly positive intercept
would indicate that the fund could perform better by being more
active. The results indicate that only 11%–15% of all funds in our
sample could have achieved significantly higher in-sample Sharpe
ratios by tilting more aggressively toward their active portfolios
(t-statistics of the intercepts above 1.96).
all active fund managers. For a typical fund manager
who invests in a limited number of stocks, the higher
idiosyncratic risk on the alpha-generating stocks in
her active portfolio could discourage her from taking
more aggressive positions in her active portfolio.
Finally, in Figure 3, we show the change in Sharpe
ratios for an average fund when its manager increases
its investment in the active portfolio proportionally
from 10% to 100%. The results indicate an interesting
inverted U-shaped relationship between the Sharpe
ratio and the aggressiveness of investing in the active
portfolio. The central message is that the improve-
ment in Sharpe ratio is quantitatively small, even
when the manager chooses an optimal combination
of the benchmark and active portfolio.
4. Robustness Checks
We perform several robustness checks. First, we com-
pute DFB based on an alternative benchmark index:
the value-weighted portfolio of stocks that a fund
actually holds. Second, we consider conditional per-
formance evaluation. Finally, we consider the influ-
ence of mutual funds’ potential preferential access to
initial public offering (IPO) allocations.
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4.1. Alternative Measures of DFB
We have included 19 stock indexes widely used by
practitioners as our primary universe of performance
benchmarks. We also consider an alternative way
to construct a benchmark index for a specific fund,
namely, by forming market cap-weighted portfolios
that consist of stocks actually held by each fund. With
these specifically tailored benchmark indexes, we are
able to show qualitatively similar results.
We also consider a variation of the DFB measure by
discretizing the distance between a stock’s weight in
a fund’s portfolio and the benchmark portfolio into
two categories: over- and underweighting. In partic-
ular, we construct an indicator variable that equals 1
if the stock is overweighted by the fund and 0 other-
wise. Then we average this indicator variable for all
funds whose investment comprises that stock, as in
Equation (2). This new measure, DFBalt, captures the
fraction of funds that overweight the stock. It also can
be viewed as polling each fund manager to vote for
stocks that they perceive as future winners based on
their portfolio weighting decisions. A stock receives
a strong buy recommendation if the majority of the
funds polled are bullish about the stock; it receives
a strong sell if the majority of the funds are bearish
about it:
DFBalti1 t =
Ni∑
j=1
Indicator4wji1 t −wbi1 t > 05/Ni0 (3)
We are able to show that DFBalt is a reliable predictor
of future stock returns.
4.2. Preferential Allocations of IPOs
Gaspar et al. (2005) and Reuter (2006) argue that pref-
erential access to IPOs could lead to boosted mutual
fund performance. To assess the extent to which such
preferential allocations of IPOs might influence our
results, we exclude all stocks whose return history in
CRSP falls below six months from our sample and
repeat our portfolio analysis based on mutual funds’
deviations from benchmarks. We find that the exclu-
sion of those stocks results in negligible influence on
our results.
5. Conclusions
Despite the consensus view that active mutual funds
on average fail to outperform passive benchmarks, we
find a high investment value of the consensus wis-
dom of active mutual funds. In particular, stocks that
are heavily overweighted by active funds relative to
their benchmark indexes perform substantially better
than their underweighted counterparts. This outper-
formance is greater in stocks with more firm-specific
information, as well as in those with fewer active
mutual funds that compete for private information.
The large premium dissipates quickly as the consen-
sus view becomes publicly available. The results thus
are consistent with the notion that informed investing
by active mutual funds enhances the informativeness
of stock prices.
Our results provide new insights into the mutual
fund industry and stock market efficiency. Economists
have long been puzzled by the rapid expansion of
the actively managed mutual fund industry and the
seemingly futile attempts of active mutual funds
to outperform passive benchmarks. Applying a lens
that separates active and passive portions of individ-
ual fund portfolios, we find that the consensus wis-
dom of active mutual funds has a high investment
value, and most active funds combine their active
and passive portfolios, such that on average it is dif-
ficult to identify abnormal performance by the total
fund portfolios. These results suggest that inferences
about managerial skill or market efficiency based
on the magnitude of mutual fund alphas may be
misleading.
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